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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SURETY LIFE INSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs . 
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, 
HOWARD H. HUCKS, 
MARKWEST CORPORATION, 
a California corporation, 
and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals 
of the State of Utah, 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
A. Did the U.S. Bankruptcy petition of the entity 
Draper R.V. & Commercial Storage operate as a stay 
against the action of plaintiff particularly if 
Case No. 89-0594-CA 
Case Priority 16 
1 
defendants 
plaintiff• 
B. Did the tr 
defendants 
motions to 
motions to 
Hucks and 
C. Were there 
court nece 
summary ju 
The 
Morris v. Farn 
(1953) to the effect that the party against whom 
summary judgment has been granted is entitled to have 
all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly 
arising therefrom, considered in light most favorable 
to him. Because disposition of a case on summary 
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, 
the appellate court must review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the losing party, and affirms 
only where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material issues of fact. Themy v. Seagull Enters, 
Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah, 1979). 
relied on the stay in bankruptcy while 
s motion for stay was pending? 
ial court abuse its discretion in denying 
1
 motion to file a counterclaim, their 
set aside the summary judgment and the 
set aside the defaults of Howard H. 
Markwest Corporation? 
material controverted facts before the 
ssitating trial on the merits and making 
dgment improper? 
standard for review is set forth in 
sworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 
2 
Ill. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The following statutes and cases are 
applicable: 
ADDENDUM A: Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 57-1-32, and 
Utah Code Annonted, Sec. 57-1-33. 
ADDENDUM B: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55 (a) 
(2); and 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(f); 
ADDENDUM C: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58 
A (d); 
ADDENDUM D: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 
(b) ; 
ADDENDUM E: U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 11 USCS Sec. 362 (a) 
(1) ; 
ADDENDUM F: U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 11 USCS Sec. 362 (c); 
ADDENDUM G: U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 11 USCS Sec. 1301 
(a) ; 
ADDENDUM H: Rule 3 of the Rules of the Court of 
Appeals. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendants entered into an agreement among 
themselves to construct and operate a recreational 
vehicle storage center in Draper, Utah. Originally 
defendant MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM intended to construct 
the project with his son, Wayne Burningham, but after 
3 
contacts with an initial lender, they were informed 
they needed to bring in additional contract experience. 
The defendants agreed among themselves that the general 
contractor would be MARKWEST CORPORATION (a company 
operated by defendant HOWARD HUCKS), with Wayne 
Burningham as the supervisor. On January 9, 1987, 
defendants executed a promissory note in the sum of one 
million dollars ( $1, 000,000.00) , payable to SURETY LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, the long-term contractor. A copy of 
the note is attached as Exhibit "A" to the Complaint. 
(R. 007.) Defendant MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM signed the 
note individually. Defendants HOWARD H. HUCKS, MELVIN 
K. BURNINGHAM, and a non-defendant Wayne Burningham 
signed as guarantors to the note on the same date. (R. 
101.) In addition, defendants executed a trust deed 
to the plaintiff which is referred to in the Complaint. 
Defendants allege that the plaintiff SURETY LIFE INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, as the long-term lender, was a partner 
with United Savings, the construction lender, and that, 
because of interference by the loan supervisors, cost 
overruns and delays were incurred. In addition, defen-
dants claim that, because of the refusal of the long-
term lender and construction lender to release funds 
for the project, including the release of monies for 
4 
advertising, the result was the folding of the project 
and the defendants' default under the loan. On the 
15th day of September, 1987, counsel for the plaintiff 
recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell. On 
July 27, 1988, the plaintiff conducted a Trustee Sale 
at public auction for seven hundred thousand dollars 
($700,000.00) for the property and buildings con-
structed, known as Draper RV & Commercial Center. 
A few days prior to the Trustee Sale, non-defendant 
Wayne Burningham caused a Petition to be filed in 
Bankruptcy for Draper RV & Commercial Center. Notice 
was given to the trustee, Mr. Clark W. Sessions, who is 
also counsel for the plaintiff. Because the 
Bankruptcy Petition did not name any of the defendants 
The trustee refused to postpone the Trustee Sale. In 
the Trustee Deed, dated July 29, 1988, the trustee 
referred to an action of MELVIN KEITH BURNINGHAM in 
another suit wherein BURNINGHAM referred to his 
business as Draper R.V. & Commercial Storage. (R. 40.) 
On September 14, 1988, a Complaint was filed naming 
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, MARKWEST CORPORATION as 
designated defendants with JOHN DOES I through X. 
Defendant MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM filed an Answer to the 
Complaint on October 18, 1988, signed by his counsel 
5 
J. Douglas Kinateder. The answer referred to the 
pending U.S. Bankruptcy Action (R. 48). Among the 
other defenses submitted in the answer was the failure 
of the plaintiff to sell the property for market value. 
On October 26, 1988, defendant MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM 
filed a Motion To Set Aside or Vacate Trustee Sale of 
Real Property in the same action, (R. 105.) The 
Motion to Set Aside referred to the Bankruptcy case in 
the name of Draper RV & Commercial Storage in Case No. 
88-4245 of the Bankruptcy Court for the Central 
District of Utah. 
On October 21, 1988, plaintiff filed a Motion 
to Amend Complaint to add causes of action pertaining 
to the individual guarantors of the promissory note and 
trust deed. On November 7, 1988, defendant filed 
objections to the Motion to Amend the Complaint, 
referring again to the automatic stay in the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court. The court did not grant leave to 
file the amended complaint; however, until January 3, 
1989. (R. 141.) In the meantime, plaintiff served 
HOWARD H. HUCKS, individually and as president of 
MARKWEST CORPORATION, with the original Complaint which 
did not mention the liability of the guarantors, on 
October 20, 1988. (R.109-112.) On October 27, 1988, 
6 
HOWARD HUCKS was served with a copy of the Amended 
Complaint. (R. 115.) 
On November 7, 1988, plaintiff filed a Motion 
for Relief From Stay in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and 
mailed a copy of the motion to HOWARD HUCKS in Santa 
Barbara, California. (R. 304.) On January 9, 1989, 
just six (6) days after the court signed permission for 
plaintiff to file the Amended Complaint, a default 
judgment was taken against HOWARD H. HUCKS and MARKWEST 
CORPORATION in the sum of $555,668.37 for failure of 
MARKWEST or HOWARD H. HUCKS to respond to the Amended 
Complaint. A certificate of mailing of the default 
judgement with a blank date of December, 1988 was 
unsigned. The unsigned certificate was addressed to J. 
Douglas Kinateder, attorney for MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM, 
but no reference was made to a certificate of mailing 
to HOWARD HUCKS or MARKWEST CORPORATION. (R. 145,146.) 
The amount of the default judgment was $557,653.30. 
Though counsel did not receive a copy of the judgment, 
he did receive a copy of the default certificate and 
filed, on January 20, 1989, a Motion to Set Aside the 
Default of Defendant MARKWEST CORPORATION, (R. 147-149) 
with accompanying Affidavit in Support of Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment Against MARKWEST CORPORA-
7 
TION. (R. 151.) The motion was never responded to. 
On March 8r 1989, plaintiff filed its Motion 
for Summary Judgment with no supporting affidavits, but 
with a Memorandum which quoted portions of the 
deposition transcript taken of MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM. 
On March 20, 1989, defendants filed Objection to Motion 
for Summary Judgment and requested oral argument. An 
extension was requested to March 30, 1989 to submit 
affidavits and Memorandum in Opposition. On March 30, 
1989, Wayne Burningham, son of defendant MELVIN K. 
BURNINGHAM, filed an Affidavit in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment stating, among other things, that 
he had been the manager of Draper RV & Commercial 
Storage since the founding of the company in January, 
1986, and had been the principal agent of MELVIN K. 
BURNINGHAM, that he was a licensed real estate broker, 
and was familiar with the values of the storage project 
and it was his opinion that the project as storage 
condo units had the value of one million seven hundred 
fifty thousand dollars ($1,750,000.00). On April 5, 
1989, plaintiff moved to strike Wayne Burningham's 
affidavit, or in the alternative, submitted the 
decision for ruling. (R. 216.) On April 7, 1989, a 
Motion to Set Aside the Default of defendant HOWARD H. 
8 
HUCKS was filed. (R. 221.) The motion was supported 
by an affidavit of J. Douglas Kinateder, attorney for 
defendants, and dated April 10, 1989. (R. 227.) An 
unsigned affidavit of HOWARD HUCKS also was filed in 
support. (R. 225.) HOWARD HUCKS was not able to sign 
because the affidavit did not reach him in California 
in time. On April 8, 1989, HOWARD HUCKS signed his 
affidavit in support of the motion to set aside. 
Two very confusing events then quickly 
followed. On April 18, 1989, the Honorable Raymond S. 
Uno granted (according to Minute Entry) summary judg-
ment pursuant to Rule 4-501 in favor of the plaintiff. 
The Minute Entry is recorded as 246 of the record; 
however, it bears no filing stamp. On April 26, 1988, 
Judge Uno issued a Minute Entry entitled, "Court 
Ordered Notice," and stated that the court on its own 
motion ordered that oral argument is granted on 
plaintiff's motion. (R. 247.) The matter was set for 
hearing for April 27, 1989, at 9:00 AM. Since the 
plaintiff never filed a motion for oral argument, this 
had to be in error as the defendant was the one who 
requested the hearing on oral argument. (R. 176-177.) 
On April 27, 1989, at 9:00 AM, defendants' counsel 
appeared for hearing and was informed by the clerk that 
9 
summary judgment had already been granted. Upon 
further inquiry and persistence, counsel for the 
plaintiff appeared and in a conference with the court, 
the court informed the parties that he would not sign a 
summary judgment until the matter could be continued 
for further hearing. However, the court thereafter 
behaved as if the summary judgment had been granted and 
plaintiff and defendants had to labor under the premise 
that they could only set aside the judgment pursuant to 
Rule 60 B. 
At the conference on April 27, 1989, the 
court also stated that the defendants should tender 
their counterclaim by filing, though the court refused 
to rule on whether the counterclaim would be permitted. 
The counterclaim was tendered by filing (R. 248-258.), 
and the matter was treated as if the defendants had 
made an oral motion to file the counterclaim. 
Plaintiff filed objection to defendants' motion to file 
answer and counterclaim (R. 265-267.) and plaintiff 
replied to the counterclaim. (R. 277 - 285.) 
Thereafter, supporting affidavits to defendants' 
position were filed, among which was one of Howard 
Hucks wherein he testified that he believed a Stay of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court was in effect as he received 
10 
a copy of the Motion for Relief From Stay but never 
received a copy of the Order relieving the stay. (R. 
291 -304.) The motion to vacate or set aside the 
summary judgment was also filed as defendants were 
unaware, or at least uncertain, whether the court was 
considering arguments to set aside its summary judgment 
or whether the court had, in fact, not ruled on the 
summary judgment issues. (R. 305 - 312.) Thereafter, 
supporting memoranda were filed which are part of the 
record. An affidavit of this counsel (R. 291 - 294.) 
states that in a thorough search of the bankruptcy 
records at U.S. District Court, the order of relief 
from stay on plaintiff's petition had never been signed 
as of May 15, 1989. Plaintiff was granted relief from 
stay after trial in December of 1988. A copy of the 
Order of Relief from Stay has never been made a part of 
the record in the above appeal. 
The summary judgment order of the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno has never been signed. (R. 260-262.) 
After oral argument on or about June 2, 1989, 
on all pending motions the court signed an order on 
June 12, 1989, (R. 341 - 343.) wherein the court 
denied the motion of HOWARD HUCKS to set aside the 
default judgment against him, denied the motion of 
11 
MELVIN K. BURNINGHAM to vacate or set aside the summary 
judgment. It is from that order that this appeal is 
taken. 
V. 
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
The relevant facts and citations to the record 
have been stated in the preceding STATEMENT OF THE 
CASE. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant BURNINGHAM argues that where the 
defendants operated under the name of Draper RV & 
Commercial Storage, the filing of the bankruptcy of 
that entity should be treated as a stay in the pro-
ceedings until the Court signed its order lifting the 
stay. The order was not signed until June 4, 1989, 
after the trial court made its final rulings granting 
summary judgment and denying all motions of the defend-
ants. Defendant BURNINGHAM also argues that the Court 
abused its discretion in not setting aside the default 
of defendants Howard Hucks and Markwest Corporation and 
in not allowing the filing of a counterclaim of defend-
ants. Said counterclaim alleged damages caused by the 
12 
failure of plaintiff and its lending partner to timely 
release funds for the completion of the storage units 
and advertising. 
Defendant BURNINGHAM argues further that 
there were controverted and triable issues of fact 
making the granting of summary judgment improper; 
namely, whether defendant BURNINGHAM was(lncompetent)to 
sign the guarantee after a stroke and the market value 
of the property at the time of the Trustee's sale from 
which the deficiency must be determined. '-
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE FILING OF THE BANKRUPTCY PETITION OF 
DRAPER R.V. & COMMERCIAL STORAGE STAYED THE 
SUIT OF PLAINTIFF IN DISTRICT COURT, OR AT 
LEAST JUSTIFIED THE RELIEF REQUESTED OF 
DEFENDANTS BEFORE DISTRICT COURT WHERE THEY 
RELIED ON THE STAY AND PLAINTIFF'S ACTIONS. 
Under the United States bankruptcy law 
actions in state courts are stayed against the debtor. 
11 U.S.C.S. #362 (a)(1 -4), and #1301 (a) (See 
addendum). The stay exists until the case is closed or 
dismissed. 11 USCS #362 (c)(2)(A)(B) addendum. 
Plaintiff was aware of the name of the 
project for which the funds were expended and had 
experienced litigation over the project in another suit 
13 
with the Burninghams and Draper R.V. & Commercial 
Storage in which restraining orders on earlier proposed 
trustee sales by the plaintiff were sought. Draper 
R.V. was not a corporation but a partnership of the 
defendants, which was known by the plaintiff. 
Even if defendants were not named 
individually on the bankruptcy petition filed a few 
days before the trustee's sale, the defendants were co-
debtors with Draper R.V. & Commercial storage. 
11 USCS #1301 (a)(1)(2) (Addendum). The only 
exceptions are when the debtors incurred the debt in 
the ordinary course of their business or the case has 
been dismissed. In any event the remedy of plaintiff 
would be to see a relief from stay. This plaintiff 
sought to do and sent a copy of the motion for relief 
from stay to Howard Hucks. (R. 304). Plaintiff 
obtained an oral ruling of relief from stay in mid 
December 1988, but had continued in the meantime to 
serve summons and complaints and amended complaints on 
the defendants. No order of relief from stay was ever 
signed by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court as of May 15, 1989. 
Howard Hucks stated under oath in his 
affidavit that he relied on plaintiff's motion for 
relief from stay in delaying to answer the Utah civil 
14 
suit. (R. 298,299). 
While plaintiff chose to mail Hucks a copy of 
the Motion for Relief From Stay they did not choose to \ 
mail him a copy of the default nor the default judgment 
nor their motion to amend the complaint nor the Order J 
on the Motion permitting the amendment of the 
complaint. In the event the court should not determine 
that the defendants were codebtors with Draper R.V. & 
Commercial Storage, and therefore beneficiaries of the 
automatic stay under 11 USCS #1301 (a), defendant 
submits that the reliance on the stay at least 
justifies a finding of excusable neglect under Rule 60 
(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Order 
of the Honorable Raymond S. Uno should be reversed and J 
the case remanded for trial. 
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW DEFENDANTS TO FILE ANSWERS AND A 
COUNTERCLAIM AND IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In review of a summary judgment, the party 
against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled 
to have all the facts presented, and all the inferences 
fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most 
favorable to that party. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 
15 
123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953). 
The court, recognizing that the party 
adversely affected by the summary judgment has not had 
an opportunity for trial, therefore views the facts in 
the light most favorable to that party. Estate 
Landscape J5 Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain 
States Tel. £ Tel. Co., 793 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
In Christensen v. Financial Serv. Co., 14 
Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010 (1963), the court stated a 
party opposing a motion for summary judgment is not 
required to file opposing affidavits, but may stand 
upon his pleadings provided that his allegations, if 
proved, would establish a basis for recovery. 
The court ruled in Williams v. Barber, 765 
P.2d 887 (Utah, 1988) that a defendant's failure to 
oppose plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment 
was a capitulation only on the question of whether 
there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect 
to his breach of duty, and granting judgment did not 
relieve plaintiff of the obligation to prove any 
damages he sustained that were proximately caused by 
defendant's negligence. 
On a motion for summary judgment against a 
16 
party, the court ruled that where some of the facts are 
in dispute, a judgment can properly be rendered against 
him only if, on the undisputed facts, that party has no 
valid defense. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Hendrixson, 9 
Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d 416 (1959) (emphasis added) 
I n
 B i H Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P. 
2d 238 (Utah, 1977), the court ruled that the presence j 
of a dispute as to materials facts disallows the / 
granting of a summary judgment. 
The court stated that summary judgment is 
never used to determine what the facts are, but only to 
ascertain whether there are any material issues of fact 
in dispute. Hill ex rel Fogel v. Grand Cent., Inc., 25 
Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970) 
In order for a nonmoving party to oppose 
successfully a motion for summary judgment and send the 
issue to a fact-finder, it is only necessary for the 
party to prove its legal theory and to show facts 
controverting the facts as stated in the moving party's 
affidavit. It is not necessary for the nonmoving party 
to prove its legal theory. Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988) 
The courts are, and should be, reluctant to 
17 
invoke a remedy of summary judgment because such a 
ruling prevents litigants from fully presenting their 
case to the court. Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 
10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960) 
The record must be carefully scrutinized to 
see if the party presents allegations which, if true, 
would entitled him to judgment because the party 
against whom a summary judgment is entered is deprived 
of the privilege of trial. Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 
1266 (Utah 1976) 
/
 If there is any genuine issue as to any 
material fact, the motion for summary judgment should 
be denied. Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 
862, cert, denied, 344 U.S. 886, 73 S. Ct. 186, 97 L. 
Ed. 685 (1952); Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 
(Utah, 1978) 
A summary judgment is erroneous unless there 
is a showing that the disfavored party cannot produce 
evidence that would reasonably support a finding in its 
favor on a material or determinative issue of fact. 
Bridge v. Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P.2d 909 (1960) 
A summary judgment was ruled improper where 
affidavit in support of motion for summary judgment and 
supporting documents showed unsupported conclusions and 
18 
unresolved issues of fact, even though the nonmoving 
party did not present affidavits in opposition to 
motion for summary judgment. Frisbee v. K. &: IC Const. 
Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utahr 1984) 
The court ruled that a summary judgment 
dismissing an action to collect a promissory note was 
improper because of the incompetency of the maker where 
evidence that a guardian had been appointed for the 
nonmoving party under the Uniform Veterans' Guardian-
ship Act raised substantial fact issue. Home Town Fin. 
Corp. v. Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 368 P.2d 72 (1962) 
The purpose of Sec. 57-1-33, Utah Code 
Annotated, is to protect the debtor, who in a 
nonjudicial foreclosure has no right of redemption, 
from a creditor who could purchase the property at the 
sale for a low price and then hold the debtor liable 
for a large deficiency. First Security Bank v. Felger, 
658 F.Supp. 175 ID. Utah 1987) cited in Christenson v. 
Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah, 1988) 
POINT III: THERE ARE CONTROVERTED FACTS AND ISSUES 
JUSTIFYING TRIAL ON THE MERITS AS RAISED IN 
THE PLEADINGS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Counsel for defendant Burningham signed the 
answer for his client and the amended answer. (R. 
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48, 49, 140-141). In the amended answer is raised the 
issue of capacity (R. 140) for health reasons. Counsel 
realizes that there is nothing in the record to explain 
defendant Melvin Burningham's health. Counsel did not 
have time for reasons explained in his affidavit to do 
more than controvert the issue of damages. (See 
affidavit of J. Douglas Kinateder R. 291-294). 
Defendant, through his counsel, submits however, that 
there is evidence if not absolute proof, that defendant 
was confused at his deposition, portions of which has 
been offered by plaintiff. Defendant Melvin 
Burningham believed that the guarantee agreement and 
the note were the same (R.157). He also cited "Error 
in Memory" or "Could not remember" at the time as 
reasons for his corrections to his deposition (R. 180). 
Should the court have permitted the filing of 
the counterclaim issues of plaintiff's own 
contributions to the losses on the project would be 
examined under counts of fraud, breach of contract, and 
breach of fiduciary duty. (Counterclaim proffered R. 
248-258.) 
The main issue to be tried is that of the 
market value at the time of the trustee's sale. This 
sale took place under rush arrangements to avoid, where 
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possible, the automatic stay. Both answers of 
defendant Burningham and the affidavits of Howard Hucks 
and Wayne Burningham state their opinion as to the 
market value of the property being around a million 
dollars higher than the price at the trustee's sale. 
It is clear under 57-1-32 Utah Code Ann. (Addendum) the 
debtor has a right to trial on the issue of market 
value. In First Sec. Bank v. Felger 658 F. Supp. 175 
(D. Utah 1987), the federal court interpreting Utah Law 
held the purpose of the statute was to protect the 
debtor from a creditor who could sell the property for 
a low price and then hold the debtor liable for a large 
deficiency. 
\A" 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the parties involvement in the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court during critical stages of the 
proceedings in the above court, the lack of notices to 
some of the defendants, even though notices may not 
have been legally required, the affidavits of defendant 
which were submitted, the actions of the District Court 
in granting summary judgment and then scheduling 
arguments on summary judgment and the confusing status 
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of the existence of the case thereafter, and most 
importantly, for the controverted issues and facts 
relating to damages, the case should be remanded for 
trial and the Order of the Third Judicial District 
Court overturned. The damages involved are substantial 
and the parties should be entitled to a trial on the 
merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of 
October, 1991. 
J. DOUGLAS KINATEDER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM B: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 55 (a) 
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ADDENDUM C: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58 
A (d) ; 
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ADDENDUM F: U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 11 USCS Sec. 362 (c); 
ADDENDUM G: U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 11 USCS Sec. 1301 
(a) ; 
ADDENDUM H: Rule 3 of the Rules of the Court of 
Appeals. 
57-1-30 REAL ESTATE 962 
57-1-30. Sole of trust property by trustee — Cor-
porate stock evidencing water rights 
given to secure trust deed. 
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water rights 
used, intended to be used, or suitable for wise on the 
trust property and which are hypothecated to secure 
an obligation secured by a trust deed may be sold 
with the trust property, or any part thereof, at the 
trustee's sale in the manner provided in this act. 
lWil 
57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in performance 
of obligations secured — Reinstate-
ment — Cancellation of recorded no-
tice of default. 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum 
of any obligation secured by a trust deed has, prior to 
the maturity date fixed in such obligation, become 
due or been declared due by reason of a breach or 
default in the performance of any obligation secured 
by the trust deed, including a default in the payment 
of interest or of any installment of principal, or by 
reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance 
with the terms of the trust deed, taxes, assessments, 
premiums for insurance, or advances made by the 
beneficiary in accordance with terms of such obliga-
tion or of such trust deed, the trustor or his successor 
in interest in the trust property or any part thereof or 
any other person having a subordinate lien or encum-
brance of record thereon or any beneficiary under a 
subordinate trust deed, at any time witiiin three 
months of the filing for record of notice of default 
under such trust deed, if the power of sale is to be 
exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or his successor 
in interest the entire amount then due under the 
terms of such trust deed (including costs and ex-
penses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of 
buch obligation, or trust deed, and the trustee's and 
attorney's fees actually incurred) other than such por-
tion of the principal as would not then be due had no 
default occurred, and thereby cure the default there-
tofore existing and, thereupon, all proceedings there-
tofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discon-
tinued and the obligation and trust deed shall be re-
instated and shall be and remain in force and effect 
the same as if no such acceleration had occurred. 
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed rein-
stated in the manner provided in Subsection (1), the 
beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand of any 
prison having an interest in the trust property, exe-
cute and deliver to him a request to the trustee to 
execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of 
the recorded notice of default under such trust deed; 
and any beneficiary under a trust deed, or his as-
signee, who, for a period of 30 days after such de-
mand, refuses to request the trustee to execute and 
deliver such cancellation is liable to the person enti-
tled to t»uch request for all damages resulting from 
such refusal. A release and reconveyance given by 
the trustee or beneficiary, or both, or the execution of 
a trustee's deed constitutes a cancellation of a notice 
of default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded no-
tice of default under a triibt deed is, when acknowl-
edged, entitled to be recorded and is sufficient if made 
and executed by the trustee in substantially the fol-
lowing form: 
Cancellation of Notice of Default 
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of de-
fault filed for record , 19 , and record in 
Book , Page , Records of County, (or 
filed of record , 19 , with recorder's entry 
No. , County), Utah, which notice of de-
fault refers to the trust deed executed by as 
trustor, in which is named as beneficiary and 
as trustee, and filed for record , 19 , 
and recorded in Book , Page , Records of 
County, (or filed of record , 19 , with 
recorder's entry No. , County), Utah. 
(legal description) 
Signature of Trustee 
1SS5 
57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Ac- 1 
tion to recover balance due upon obli-
gation for which trust deed was given 
as security. I 
At any time within three months after any sale of 
property under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, 
an action may be commenced to recover the balance I 
due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was I 
given as security, and in such action the complaint I 
shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness I 
which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for I 
which such property was sold, and the fair market I 
value thereof at the date of sale. Before rendenrur I 
judgment, the court shall find the fair market value I 
at the date of sale of the property sold. The courl may") 
K51 render judgment lor more than the amount by J 
which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, I 
costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and I 
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the I 
property as of the date of the sale. In any action I 
brought under this section, the prevailing party shall I 
be entitled to collect iia costs and reasonable attorney | 
feeb incurred in bringing an action under this section. 
1SS5 
57-1-33. Satisfaction of obligation secured by i 
trust deed — Reconveyance of trust 
property. 
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has 
been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request 
by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. The 
reconveyance may designate the grantee therein as 
"the person or persons entitled thereto." The benefi-
ciary under such trust deed shall deliver to the 
trustor or his successor in interest the trust deed and 
the note or other evidence of the obligation so satis-
fied. Any beneficiary under such trust deed who re-
fuses to request a reconveyance from the trustee for a 
period of thirty days after written demand therefor is 
made by the ti*ustor or his successor in interest shall 
be liable to the trustor or his successor in interest, as 
the case may be, for double damages resulting from 
such refusal, or such trustor or his successor in inter-
est may bring an action against the beneficiary and 
trustee to compel a reconveyance of the trust property 
and in such action the judgment of the court shall be 
that the trustee reconvey the trust property and that 
the beneficiary pay to the trustor, or his successor in 
interest, as the case may be, the costs of suit includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee and all damages re- J 
suiting from the refusal of the beneficiary to request 
a reconveyance as hereinabove provided. imu 
67-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee — 
Foreclosure of truat deed — Limitation 
of actions. 
The trubtee's sale of property under a trust deed 
shall be made, or an action to foreclose a trust deed as 
provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on 
real property shall be commenced, within the period 
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Rule 55. Defau l t 
(a) Defau l t 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is Bought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default. 
"~ (2) Notice to party in de fau l t After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or 
in the event that it ia necessary for the court to 
Lconduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the nondefaulting party. 
(b) J u d g m e n t Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows: 
(1) l iy the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of Una state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By t h e c o u r t In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the t ruth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter, the court may con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper. 
(c) Se t t ing a s ide defaul t . For good cause shown 
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs , c o u n t e r c l a i m a n t s , cross-claim-
a n t s . The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment tiy default is a plain-
till', a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded 
a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en-
tered against the mate of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Rule 56. Summary j u d g m e n t 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac-
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any tune, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The mo-
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material face and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case no t fully ad jud ica ted on mot ion . If on 
motion under tlua rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is 
necessary, the court a t the hearing of the motion, by 
examining the pleudings and the evidence before it 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable as-
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually and 
in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make 
an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro-
versy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) F o r m of affidavits; fu r the r tes t imony; de-
fense r equ i r ed . Supporting and opposing affidavits 
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or cer-
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be ob-
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be 
had or may make such other order as ia just. «" 
(g) Affidavits m a d e in bad faith. Should it ap-
pear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose ot% 
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party em-
ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments . 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, 
II 
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shall be in accordance with these rule*, and the right 
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circum-
stances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and 
39 The existence of another adequate remedy docs 
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases 
where it is appropriate. The court mav order a speedy 
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and 
may advance it on the calendar. 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless 
the court otherwise directs and subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a 
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict ac-
companied by answers to interrogatories returned by 
a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the 
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith 
signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided 
in Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of 
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in regis-
ter of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is 
complete and shall bp deemed entered for all pur-
poses, except the creation of a lien on real property, 
when the same is signed and filed as herein above 
providpd The clerk shall immediately make a nota-
tion of the judgment in the register of actions and the 
judgment docket —*^ 1 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment The 
prnvnihng party shall promptly give notice of thej 
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and! 
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk J 
of the court. However, the tim<» for filing a notice of J 
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement ofl 
this provision. N • J 
(e) Judgment offer death of a party. If a party 
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact 
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be 
rendered thereon 
(0 Judgment by confession. Whenever a judg-
ment by confession is authorized by statute, the party 
seeking thr* samr» must file with the clerk of the court 
in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, 
verified by the defendant, to the following efTcct 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money 
due or to become due, it shall concisely state the 
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly dun or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the 
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contin-
gent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not ex-
ceed the same, 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for 
a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the state-
ment, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment 
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of 
entry, if any. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985, Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment. 
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judg-
ment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any 
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof, 
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor 
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed 
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within 
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the 
CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 59 
following manner (1) by written instrument, duly ac-
knowledged bv such owner or attorney, or (2) by ac-
knowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the 
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the 
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the 
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk Every satis-
faction or a part of the judgment, or as to one or more 
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid 
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming 
them. 
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judg-
ment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of 
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall 
have been lost, the court m which such judgment was 
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof, 
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to 
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the 
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered 
upon the docket. 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction 
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the 
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case, 
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also 
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, in-
cluding the amount paid, on the margin of the judg-
ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfac-
tion. 
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall 
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any 
judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon 
the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the 
extent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to 
be a hen In case of partial satisfaction, if any execu-
tion shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such 
execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of 
such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to 
collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from 
the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon 
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other 
counties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall 
have been entered on the judgment docket of the 
county where such judgment was first docketed, a 
certified transcript of satisfnction, or a certificate by 
the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with 
the clerk of the district court in any other county 
where the judgment may have been docketed There-
upon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be 
made by the clerk of such court, and such entry shall 
have the samp effect as in the county where the same 
was originally entered. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment, 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or port of the issues, for any of the follow-
ing causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a 
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and con-
clusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which cither party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury, and whenever any 
one or more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
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(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary pru-
dence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he could 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appear-
ing to have been given under the iniluence of 
passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial 
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry 
of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavit*; time for filing. When the applica-
tion for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), 
(2), (3), or (4), it aliali be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affi-
davits they shall be served with the motion. The op-
posing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within 
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be 
served may be extended tor an additional period not 
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The 
court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative 
may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, 
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A mo-
tion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served 
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
llule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(u) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judg-
ments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative 
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if 
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an 
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereaf-
ter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
I ^ wwlth-»leiive of the appellate court. 
jW/ (b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
fo Vnewly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion 
I and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
I furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal rep-
I resentative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
I Ting for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver-
I M^ngt;. «nrpiw-/ir itvi-n^hfc
 n*ffW; (2) newly discov-
e r e d evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi-
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by 
iiule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the opera-" 
tion of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an indepen-
dent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless re-
fusal to take such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. 
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judg-
ment. 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or 
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue 
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless 
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for 
the security of the adverse party as are proper, other-
wise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judg-
ment In its discretion and on such conditions for the 
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court 
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to en-
force, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion 
for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made 
pursuant to Uule 59, or of a motion for relief from a 
judgment or order made pursuant to liule GO, or of a 
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for 
a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a 
motion for amendment to the findings or for addi-
tional findings made pursuant to llule 52(b). 
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal 
is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment 
granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the 
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, 
or grant an ii\junction during the pendency of the 
appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for 
the security of the rights of the adverse party. 
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken 
the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may ob-
tain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited 
by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or 
alter the time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay 
is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by 
the court. 
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof. 
When an appeal is taken by the United States, the 
state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by 
direction of any department of either, and the opera-
tion or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no 
bond, obligation, or other security shall be required 
from the appellant. 
(f) Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where 
the defendant is adjudged guilty of usurping, intrud-
ing into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or 
military, within this state, the execution of the judg-
ment shall not be stayed on an appeal. 
(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The 
provisions in this rule do not limit any power of an 
appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay 
proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to 
suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction, writ 
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11 USCS § 362. Automatic stay ' , . 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this..section a petition filed under section/ 
301. 302, or 303 of this title [11 USCS § 301, 302, or 303]. or an application filed 
under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 
78ccc(a)(3)) [15 USCS § 78eee(a)(3)], operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, 
of— 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of 
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the 
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the 
case under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 ct scq.j, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title [11 USCS 
§§ 101 et seq.]; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a 
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title [11 
USCS §§ 101 et seq.]; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the 
^estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien 
to tiie extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement 
of the case under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.]; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.]; 
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commence-
ment of the case under this title [11 USCS § 101 et seq.] against any claim 
against the debtor; and 
(K) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States 
Tax Court concerning the debtor. 
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title [11 USCS 
§ 301, 302, or 303], or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities 
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78cee(a)(3)) [15 USCS § 78eee(a)(3)], 
docs not operate as a stay— 
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of 
a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor; 
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of alimony, maintenance, 
or support from property that is not properly of the estate; 
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect an interest in 
property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such 
perfection under section 546(b) of this title [11 USCS § 546(b)] or to the extent 
that such act is accomplished within the period provided under section 
547(e)(2)(A) of this tide [11 USCS § 547(e)(2)(A)]; 
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation 
of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental 
unit's police or regulatory power; 
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, 
other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a 
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory 
power; 
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity broker, 
forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or securities clear-
ing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commodity 
contracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this title [11 USCS §761(4)]. forward 
contracts, or securities contracts, as defined in section 741(7) of this title [11 
USCS §741(7)], that constitutes the setoif of a claim against the debtor for a 
11 USCS § 362 
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(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this 
section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate; and 
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section continues until 
the earliest of— 
(A) the time the case is closed; 
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or 
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title [11 USCS §§ 701 et seq.] 
concerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title 
^ - • [11 USCS §§ 901 et seq., 1101 et seq., 1201 et seq. or 1301 et seq.], the time a 
discharge is granted or denied. 
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall 
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by 
terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay— 
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property 
of such party in interest; or 
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this 
section, if— 
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and 
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section for relief from the 
stay of any act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section, 
such stay is terminated with respect to the party in interest making such request, 
unless the court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in effect 
pending the conclusion of, or as a result of, a final hearing ^nd determination under 
subsection (d) of this section. A hearing under this subsection may be a preliminary 
hearing, or may be consolidated with the final hearing under subsection (d) of this 
section. The court shall order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion 
of the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the 
conclusion of such final hearing. If the hearing under this subsection is a prelimi-
nary hearing, then such final hearing shall be commenced not later than thirty days 
after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing. 
(0 Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or without a hearing, shall 
grant such relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section as is 
necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in property, if 
such interest will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity for notice and a 
hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section. 
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section concerning relief from 
the stay of any act under subsection (a) of this section— 
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof on the issue of the 
debtor's equity in property; and 
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all other issues. 
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section 
shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate 
circumstances, may recover punitive damages. 
(Nov. 6, 1978, P. L. 95-598, Title I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2570; July 27, 1982, P. L. 97-
222, §3, 96 Stat. 235; July 10, 1984, P. L. 98-353, Title III, Subtitle A, §304, 
Subtitle C, § 363(b), Subtitle F, § 392, Subtitle H, § 441, 98 Stat. 352, 363, 365, 371; 
Oct. 21, 1986, P. L. 99-509, Title V, Subtitle A, §5001, 100 Stat. 1911; Oct. 27, 
1986, P.L. 99-554, Title II, Subtitles B, C, §§ 2570), 283(d) 100 Stat. 3115, 3116.) 
11 USCS § 362 
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11 USCS § 1323. Modification of plan before confirmation 
11 USCS § 1324. Confirmation hearing 
11 USCS § 1325. Confirmation of plan 
11 USCS§ 1326. Payments 
11 USCS § 1327. Effect of confirmation 
11 USCS §1328. Discharge 
11 USCS § 1329. Modification of plan after confirmation 
11 USCS § 1330. Revocation of an order of confirmation 
SUBCHAPTER I—OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATION, AND THE 
ESTATE 
11 USCS § 1301. Stay of action against codebtor 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, after the order for 
relief under this chapter [11 USCS §§1301 et seq.], a creditor may not act, or 
commence or continue any civil action, to collect all or any part of a consumer debt 
of the debtor from any individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor, or that 
secured such debt, unless— 
(1) such individual became liable on or secured such debt in the ordinary course 
j of such individual's business; or 
J (2) the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7 or 11 of 
j ^ this title [11 USCS §§ 701 et seq. or 1101 et seq.]. 
(b) A creditor may present a negotiable instrument, and may give notice of dishonor 
of such an instrument. 
(c) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall 
grant relief from the stay provided by subsection (a) of this section with respect to a 
creditor, to the extent that— 
(1) as between the debtor and the individual protected under subsection (a) of 
this section, such individual received the consideration for the claim held by such 
creditor; 
(2) the plan filed by the debtor proposes not to pay such claim; or 
(3) such creditor's interest would be irreparably harmed by continuation of such 
stay. 
(d) Twenty days after the filing of a request under subsection (c)(2) of this section 
for relief from the stay provided by subsection (a) of this section, such stay is 
terminated with respect to the party in interest making such request, unless the 
debtor or any individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor files and serves 
upon such party in interest a written objection to the taking of the proposed action. 
(Nov. 6, 1978, P. L. 95-598, Title I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2645; July 10, 1984, P. L. 98-
353, Title III, Subtitle A, § 313, Subtitle H, § 524, 98 Stat. 355, 388.) 
HISTORY: ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Effective date of section: 
Section 402(a) of Act Nov. 6, 1978, provided that this section "shall take effect 
on October 1, 1979.M. 
Amendments: 
1984. Act July 10, 1984, in subsec. (c)(4), inserted "continuation of*; and added 
subsec. (d). 
11 USCS § 1301 
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE 
TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES 
RULE 
1. Scope of rules. 
2. Suspension of rules. 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS 
OF TRIAL COURTS 
3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. 
G. Bond for costs on appeal. 
7. Security: Proceedings against sureties. 
8. Stay or injunction pending appeal. 
9. Docketing statement. 
10. Motion for summary disposition. 
11. The record on appeal. 
12. Transmission of the record. 
13. Notice of filing by clerk of appellate court. 
TITLE m. REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND 
COMMITTEES. 
14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; 
intervention. 
15. The record on review. 
16. Filing of the record. 
17. Stay pending review. 
18. Applicability of other rules to review. 
TITLE IV. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS; HABEAS CORPUS 
19. Extraordinary writs. 
20. Habeas corpus proceedings. 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
21. Filing and service. 
22. Computation and enlargement of time. 
23. Motions. 
24. Briefs. 
25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem. 
26. Filing and service of briefs. 
27. Form of briefs. 
28. Prehearing conference. 
29. Oral argument. 
30. Decision of the court: Dismissal; notice of deci-
sion. 
31. Expedited appeals decided after oral argument 
without written opinion. 
32. Interest on judgment. 
33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
34. Award of costs. 
35. Petition for rehearing. 
36. Issuance of remittitur. 
37. Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismissal. 
38. Substitution of parties. 
39. Duties of the clerk. 
40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and 
discipline. 
TITLE VI. CERTIFICATION AND TRANSFER BETWEEN 
COURTS 
41. Certification of questions of law by United States 
courts. 
42. Transfer of case from Supreme Court to Court of 
Appeals. 
43. Certification by the Court of Appeals to the Su-
preme Court. 
44. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals. 
TITLE VII. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS 
45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of Court 
of Appeals. 
46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
47. Certification and transmission of record; filing; 
parties. 
48. Time for petitioning. 
49. Petition for writ of certiorari. 
50. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus 
curiae. 
51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari. 
FORMS 
TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES. 
Rule 1. Scope of rules. 
(a) Applicability of rules. These rules govern the 
procedure before the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals of Utah in all cases. Applicability of these 
rules to the review of decisions or orders of adminis-
trative agencies is governed by Rule 18. When these 
rules provide for a motion or application to bo made 
in a district, juvenile, or circuit court or an adminis-
trative agency, commission, or board, the procedure 
for making such motion or application shall be gov-
erned by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the rules of practice 
of the trial court, administrative agency, commission, 
or board. 
(b) Reference to "court." Except as provided in 
Rule 43, when these rules refer to a decision or action 
by the court, the reference shall include a panel of the 
court. The term "trial court" means the court or tribu-
nal from which the appeal is taken. The term "appel-
late court" means the court to which the appeal is 
taken. 
(c) Procedure established by statute. If a proce-
dure is provided by state statute as to the appeal or 
review of an order of an administrative agency, com-
mission, board, or officer of the state which is incon-
sistent with one or more of these rules, the statute 
shall govern. In other respects, these rules shall ap-
ply to such appeals or reviews. 
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules 
shall not be construed to extend or limit tho jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as 
established by law. 
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and abbreviated Utah 
R. App. P. 
Rule 2. Suspension of rules. 
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appel-
late court, on its own motion or for extraordinary 
cause shown, may, except as to the provisions^ of 
Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), and 48, suspend the re-
quirements or provisions of any of these rules in a 
particular case and may order proceedings in that 
case in accordance with its direction. 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS 
AND ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judg-
ments. An appeal may be taken from a district, juve-
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nile, or circuit court to the appellate court with juris-
diction over the appeal from all Anal orders and judg-
ments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing 
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court 
within the tune allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an ap-
pellant to take any step other than the timely filing 
of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the 
appeal, but is ground only for such action as the ap-
pellate court deems appropriate, which may include 
dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of 
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. It two or more 
parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or or-
der and their interests are such as to make joinder 
practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or 
may join in an appeal of another party after filing 
separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may 
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. 
Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of 
the appellate court upon its own motion or upon mo-
tion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the 
appeal aha 11 be known as the appellant and the ad-
verse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the 
appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appel-
late court. In original proceedings in the appellate 
court, the party making the original application shall 
be known as the petitioner and any other party as the 
respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of ap-
peal shall specify the party or parties taking the ap-
peal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part 
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from 
which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the 
court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking 
the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of 
appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judg-
ment or order; or, if the party is not represented by 
counsel, then on the party at the party's last known 
address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. 
At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or 
cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the ap-
peal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing 
i'eea as are established by law, and also the fee for 
docketing the appeal in the appellate court. The clerk 
of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal 
unless the filing and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the 
notice of appeal and payment of the required i'eta, the 
clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit 
one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of 
its filing, together with the docketing fee, to the clerk 
of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the 
notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the 
appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the 
docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title 
given to the action in the trial court, with the appel-
lant identified as such, but if the title does not con-
tain the name of the appellant, such name shall be 
added to the title. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order* In a 
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of 
right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with 
the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the 
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a 
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, 
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after 
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely 
motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment 
under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or 
make additional findings of fact, whether or not an 
alteration of the judgment would be required if the 
motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or 
amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new 
trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from 
the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a 
timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) un-
der Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an 
order, alter judgment, affecting the substantial rights 
of a defendant, the time for appeal for all parties shall 
run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying any other such motion. A notice 
of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the 
above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time mea-
sured from the entry of the order of the trial court 
disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. 
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a 
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of 
the judgment or order of the trial court shall be 
treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof'. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice 
of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file 
a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on 
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within 
the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) of this 
rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, 
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, 
may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expira-
tion of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this 
rule. A motion filed before expiration of the pre-
scribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court 
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after ex-
piration of the prescribed time shall be given to the 
other parties in accordance with the rules of practice 
of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days 
past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of 
entry of the order granting the motion, whichever 
occurs later. 
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocu-
tory orders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal 
from an interlocutory order may be sought by any 
party by filing a petition for permission to appeal 
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the ap-
pellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 
days after the entry of the order of the trial court, 
with proof of service on all other parties to the action. 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. The petitioner 
shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court an 
original and seven copies of the petition, or, with the 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, an original and four 
copies, together with the fee for filing a notice of up-
